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Malone: Justiciability in Texas: A Study in the Law of Public Contracts.

JUSTICIABILITY IN TEXAS: A STUDY IN
THE LAW OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS
KENNETH L. MALONE

The Texas government is divided into three distinct departments by an
express constitutional provision.' This division demands that no department
usurp the powers of another, 2 a necessity in the maintenance of such a form
of government. 3 The judiciary is vested with, and may exercise, only
judicial powers. 4 Justiciability is the concept used by the Texas courts to
implement the division of powers and to confine the courts to the exercise of
specifically judicial powers. 5 The judiciary will not consider political ques1. TEx. CoNs'r. art. II, § 1; id., comment (1955).
2. Friedman v. American Sur. Co., 137 Tex. 149, 167, 151 S.W.2d 570, 580
(1941); Wolf v. Young, 277 S.W.2d 744, 746-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Neff v. Elgin, 270 S.W. 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925,
writ ref'd); TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1.
3. Friedman v. American Sur. Co., 137 Tex. 149, 167, 151 S.W.2d 570, 580
(1941).
4. Tax. CONsT. art. V, § 1. The courts may not make laws to their own liking,
or give a remedy not provided for, or withhold one that is secured. Judicial power is
the power to adjudicate upon and protect the rights and interests of individual citizens
and to that end only to construe and apply the law. Courts determine what the law
is in relation to some existing thing already done or happened. Id., comment (1955).
5. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); Bledsoe,
Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 430, 432 (1973). A
justiciable controversy is one that is appropriate for judicial determination, and is thus
distinguished from a hypothetical, abstract, or moot or academic controversy in that it
is definite, concrete and touches the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. Justiciability is concerned with insuring that courts adjudicate only disputed issues
arising from definite controversies. 300 U.S. 240-41. Courts will not assume jurisdiction unless there is an actual controversy in existence, or the ripening seeds of one such
that litigation is imminent and inevitable. Gray v. Bush, 430 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The parties must have conflicting legal
interests, and the judgment must be one which will effectively and practically settle conflicts of such legal interests of the parties. Layne Tex. Co. v. City of Houston, 306
S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1957, writ ref'd). A justiciable controversy
must exist in declaratory judgment cases, and the question must not be hypothetical or
abstract, but must be one "touching the legal relation of the parties in legal adverse interest and must be a substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in character . . . ." Parks v. Francis, 202 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1947, no writ); see Sub-Surface Constr. Co. v. Bryant-Curington, Inc.,
533 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); A.P. Simons Co.
v. Julian, 531 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ); Fort Worth
Lloyds v. Garza, 527 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
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tions,6 moot or hypothetical cases, 7 questions that are not ripe for decision, 8
or cases prosecuted by a plaintiff who does not have the requisite standing or
justiciable interest. 9 Courts are prohibited from rendering advisory opinions and may not consider the wisdom of legislation when construing
enactments that are constitutional;1 0 the consideration of policy is solely

within the purview of legislative power." There being no inherent powers in a court, it is restricted to powers expressly conferred on it by law
plus those powers necessarily inferable from that grant. 12 As such, the
Texas courts are restricted to the consideration of questions that are "pecu3 and trial courts will not hear, nor will
liarly suited to judicial solution,""1
14
appellate courts review, controversies that do not fall within those bounds.
In addition to subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the person,
6. See Holland v. Taylor, 153 Tex. 433, 437, 270 S.W.2d 219, 221 (1954); Thiel
v. Oaks, 535 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ); Lydick
v. Chairman Dallas County Republican Executive Comm., 456 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ).
7. State v. Margolis, 439 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Layne Tex. Co. v. City of Houston, 306 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1957, writ ref'd).
8. Sub-Surface Constr. Co. v. Bryant-Curington, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fort Worth Lloyds v. Garza, 527 S.W.2d 195,
198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (one question ripe, other
not); Gray v. Bush, 430 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
9. Scott v. Board of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. 1966). The Texas
courts seem to use the terms "litigable interest," "standing," and "justiciable interest" interchangeably and synonymously. There may, however, be some differences. See Arlington Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 397 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McLean v. Morrow, 156 S.W.2d 1002, 1003
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.). See generally Sedler, Standing, Justiciability and All That: A BehavioralAnalysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479, 480 (1972).
10. Under TEx. CONsT. art. II, § 1 Texas courts are prohibited from rendering advisory opinions, and this power may not be conferred by either the legislature or agreement of the parties. State v. Margolis, 439 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Munger v. Richards, 87 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, writ ref'd). Statutes may be declared unconstitutional for the preservation
of personal rights against unwarranted legislation and for that purpose only. Neff v.
Elgin, 270 S.W. 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, writ ref'd). When a
court is called upon to enforce an apparently valid statute, it gives no consideration to
the question of whether its enforcement will work an injustice in the case before it. It
is simply not a judicial function to determine the wisdom of a statute. Landis v. Fuqua,
Inc., 159 S.W.2d 228, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd).
11. Ex parte McCloskey, 82 Tex. Crim. 531, 538, 199 S.W. 1101, 1103-04 (1917);
see Goss v. Franz, 287 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1956, writ ref'd);
Landis v. Fuqua, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 228, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd).
But see J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Sanchez, 228 S.W.2d 303, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1950, no writ) (courts not only representative of state in declaration of public policy).
12. Ex parte Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 510-11, 129 S.W.2d 270, 273-74 (1939).
13. Summers, Justiciability, 26 MOD. L. REv. 530 (1963).
14. State v. Society for Friendless Children, 130 Tex. 533, 534, 111 S.W.2d 1075,
1076 (1938).
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courts must have jurisdiction to render the particular judgment sought.' 5
Obviously, if the plaintiff lacks the justiciable interest required for a
-particular judgment he is not entitled to it. In such a case, the court is
without jurisdiction in the matter and lacks authority to hear and determine
the cause. 16 Courts are confined to the consideration of "suits" involving
matters for which the judiciary is expressly granted the power to provide a
remedy; therefore, the matter must be justiciable. 17 Although private
actions may give rise to questions of justiciability,' 8 public actions, particularly those involving public contracts and bond issues, provide the context for
a number of justiciability problems.' 9
THE REQUIREMENT OF A SPECIAL INTEREST

Governmental bodies generally enter into contracts so as to ultimately
benefit those in the community they serve. As such, it would appear that
any member of the community would have a sufficient interest in these
contracts to commence and prosecute an action relative to them. Generally,
however, an individual may not maintain such an action absent a showing of
15. Brown v. French, 413 S.W.2d 924, 926-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), rev'd
on other grounds, 424 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1967).
16. Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine cases, without which
it may not act. State v. Olsen, 360 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1962); see Bledsoe, Mootness
and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 430, 432 (1973); Comment, Con.stitutionalLitigation: Standing to Sue in the Supreme Court, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 83, 88
(1963).
17. A "suit" as contemplated by TEx. CONST. art. V, § 8, is "any proceeding in a
court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy in a court of justice which
the law affords him." H.H. Watson Co. v. Cobb Grain Co., 292 S.W. 174, 176 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted). See generally Ex parte Hughes, 133 Tex. 505,
510-11, 129 S.W.2d 270, 273-74 (1939) (neither executive nor judicial department can
create remedies or causes of action); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 523 S.W.2d
67, 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), modified and aff'd, 526 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1975).
18. See, e.g., Harris v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 517 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reed v. Tanglewilde Civic Club, 431 S.W.2d 362, 364
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Williams v. White, 263
S.W.2d 666, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REy. 331, 331-32
(1974); see Hoffman v. Elliott, 476 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. 1972) (per curiam); City
of West Lake Hills v. State ex rel. City of Austin, 466 S.W.2d 722, 727 (Tex. 1971)
(quo warranto); Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 205, 220, 281 S.W. 837, 841-42 (1926) (mandamus); City of San Antonio v. Strumberg, 70 Tex. 366, 369, 7 S.W. 754, 755 (1888)
(injunction); Lozano v. Patrician Movement, 483 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (declaratory judgment); Pierce v. Southern Pac. Co.,
410 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ ref'd); City of DeLeon v.
Fincher, 344 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (elections);.City of Waco v. Akard, 252 S.W.2d 496, 499-500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. City of San Antonio, 250 S.W.2d
259, 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ ref'd); Texas Agricultural Workers Union
v. Isbell, 195 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Parrish
v. Wright, 293 S.W. 659, 661-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1927, writ ref'd); McLaughlin v. Smith, 140 S.W. 248, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1911, writ ref'd).
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some special interest in the subject matter of the suit peculiar to him in either
his personal or representative capacity. 20 In City of San Antonio v.
Strumberg,21 the Texas Supreme Court rejected intimations that this rule
was promulgated to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and asserted that the true
underlying reasoning was that "individuals have a right to sue for a redress
of their own private injuries, but for such as affect all the public alike he is
not the representative of the public interest."'22 This rule and rationale is, of
course, applicable to suits on public contracts. 28 The governmental boay
alone has the right to sue for redress of its own injuries because it receives
the direct benefit from the suit and is the real party in interest. 24 The
individual citizen is generally precluded from suing because he could only
derive an indirect benefit from the suit. 25 The requirement of a special
interest ensures the degree of adverseness which the common law system

demands and is clearly sound when considered within the scheme of division
26
of powers.
SUITS BY TAXPAYERS

The requisite special interest must differ in kind from that of the general
public, not merely in intensity,2 7 and may not be founded upon mere
20. In the landmark case of City of San Antonio v. Strumberg, 70 Tex. 366, 7 S.W.
754 (1888), a property owner and taxpayer sued to enjoin the erection of a public building on Military Plaza, a public park. The plaintiff had no property that abutted the
plaza, and asserted no other special injury. The court said:
We think it a principle established by the overwhelming weight of authority in the
courts of all countries subject to the common law, that no action lies to restrain
an interference with a mere public right, at the suit of an individual who has not
suffered or is not threatened with some damage peculiar to himself.
Id. at 368, 7 S.W. at 755.
21. Id. at 366, 7 S.W. at 754.
22. Id. at 369, 7 S.W. at 755.
23. E.g., Franks v. Welch, 389 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); West Tex. Util. Co. v. Smith, 168 S.W.2d 665, 666-67 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1943, writ ref'd); Powell v. City of Baird, 132 S.W.2d 464, 470 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1939, no writ).
24. See Hoffman v. Davis, 128 Tex. 503, 507, 100 S.W.2d 94, 95 (1937); Sullivan
v. Universal Elec. Constr. Co., 227 S.W.2d 387, 391-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. "Our courts do not recognize the right of one to bring a lawsuit for another
merely because he might derive some indirect benefit therefrom." Hoffman v. Davis,
128 Tex. 503, 508, 100 S.W.2d 94, 96 (1937); accord, Sullivan v. Universal Elec.
Constr. Co., 227 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. See Comment, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public
Citizen, 24 Am.U.L. REv. 835, 841 (1975). Judicial decision making must necessarily
rely heavily on the parties' presentation of the issues, because these opposing viewpoints
are the basis for a more informed decision on the possible alternatives. Id. at 841.
27. Pierce v. Southern Pac. Co., 410 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967,
writ ref'd); Arlington Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 397 S.W.2d 555,
556 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejected contention that test
of justiciable interest is whether plaintiff suffered damage over and above that of gen-
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emotional or sentimental interest. 28 The class of cases upon which an
individual may sue is stringently circumscribed, so that almost all instances in
which a special interest was found involved proposed payments from tax
funds. 20 In such cases, the plaintiff is subjected to personal out-of-pocket
pecuniary injury as the result of an increased tax burden. 80
When a taxpayer sues to prevent illegal expenditures of tax funds, the
reasons for allowing the suit are as compelling as they are in an action to
enjoin the collection of illegal taxes. 31 This reasoning was espoused in the
well known "chicken salad" case.3 2 There, several private citizens were
held to have sufficient interest to sue the State Comptroller to enjoin the
payment of funds appropriated for public entertainment at the governor's
mansion. The constitution then read that the governor should receive
$4,000.00 annually, "and no more."' 33 It was held that the district court,
upon suit by taxpayers, was authorized to enjoin those expenditures which
resulted in an unconstitutional increase in the emoluments of the governor
34
because they would increase the tax burden.
Defective tax assessments may also provide the basis for taxpayers'
suits. 35 When property is omitted from the tax rolls, or an illegal exemption
is granted, a taxpayer may sue to compel an assessment without such
omission or exemption, so that he will not suffer injury from a higher tax
than he ought to be required to pay. 3 6 The improper assessment of taxes
does not, however, allow the taxpayer to escape his obligation to pay his
37
lawful taxes.
eral public); San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. City of San Antonio, 250 S.W.2d 259,
263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ ref'd).
28. Pierce v. Southern Pac. Co., 410 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967,
writ ref'd); see Gillam v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (indicating special interest must be pecuniary).
29. See Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972); City of Austin v. McCall, 95 Tex. 565, 577, 68 S.W. 791, 794-95 (1902); Altgelt v. City of San Antonio,
81 Tex. 436, 450, 17 S.W. 75, 77 (1890) (dismissed on rehearing for plaintiff's failure
to sufficiently plead injury).
30. See, e.g., Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972); City of Austin v.
McCall, 95 Tex. 565, 577, 68 S.W. 791, 794-95 (1902); Altgelt v. City of San Antonio,
81 Tex. 436, 450, 17 S.W. 75, 77 (1890).
31. Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916,
no writ); see Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Tex. 1972) (plaintiff held to
have standing even though trial court's granting of summary judgment for Comptroller
was affirmed, apparently for lack of necessary parties).
32. Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916,
no writ).
33. Id. at 371.
34. Id. at 371.
35. Whelan v. State, 155 Tex. 14, 25, 282 S.W.2d 378, 383 (1955); Altgelt v. City
of San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436, 450, 17 S.W. 75, 76 (1890).
36. Whelan v. State, 155 Tex. 14, 25, 282 S.W.2d 378, 384 (1955) (omissions);
Altgelt v. City of San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436, 450, 17 S.W. 75, 77 (1890) (illegal exemption).
37. Whelan v. State, 155 Tex. 14, 22, 282 S.W.2d 378, 383 (1955).
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Municipal contracts and bond issues often provide for repayment solely
from revenues generated by the improvements purchased. 38 Cities and
counties are generally required by statute to adopt this method of payment for
the purchase or construction and maintenance of power plants, water and
sewer systems, and other utilities.3 9 Controversies in this area culminating
in election contests, suits to enjoin the sale of bonds, to enjoin performance
40
of the contract, and to declare the contract void have all met a similar fate.
Courts have held, both implicitly and expressly, that taxpayers are precluded

from bringing a suit, even on void or illegal contracts, since the obligation
created is not to be paid from taxes. 4 1 Without such tax fund payments,
one who sues merely as a taxpayer cannot possess a justiciable interest in the
action.

42

STATUTORILY CONFERRED JUSTICIABLE INTEREST
The supreme court in City of San Antonio v. Strumberg43 announced the
rule absolutely requiring a special interest for a plaintiff to sue for redress of
a public wrong 44 and gave no intimation that this rule could be varied by
statute; that rule was followed without addition in Staples v. State ex rel.
King.45 In Dickson v. Strickland,46 however, even though the plaintiff was
held to have no justiciable interest, the assertion was made that the
legislature could, by statute, allow suits of this nature without a special
interest. 47 In Dickson, the court said that plaintiff's "lack of special interest
38. E.g., Clark v. City of San Angelo, 269 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1954, no writ); West Tex. Util. Co. v. Smith, 168 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1943, writ ref'd); Fisher v. City of Bartlett, 76 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1934, writ dism'd).
39. Hoff v. Westhoff, 102 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1936, writ
ref'd); Hazelwood v. City of Cooper, 87 S.W.2d 776, 777-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1935, writ ref'd); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1111-18 (1963), as amended,
(Supp. 1976) (cities); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2368a, § 9 (1971) (counties).
40. Franks v. Welch, 389 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (declare contract void); Estes v. City of Granbury, 314 S.W.2d 154,
155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd) (enjoin sale of bonds); Hoff
v. Westhoff, 102 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1936, writ ref'd)
(election contest); Fisher v. City of Bartlett, 76 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1934, writ dism'd) (enjoin performance on contract).
41. Powell v. City of Baird, 132 S.W.2d 464, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939,
no writ) (express); Hoff v,Westhoff, 102 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston
1936, writ ref'd) (implicit).
42. See, e.g., Franks v. Welch, 389 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); West Tex. Util. Co. v. Smith, 168 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1943, writ ref'd); Hoff v. Westhoff, 102 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.
-- Galveston 1936, writ ref'd).
43. 70 Tex. 366, 7 S.W. 754 (1888).
44. Id. at 369, 7 S.W. at 755. •
45. 112 Tex. 61, 71-72, 245 S.W. 639, 642-43 (1922).
46. 114 Tex. 176, 265 S.W. 1012 (1924).
47. Id. at 196, 265 S.W. at 1019.
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is fatal to his capacity to maintain his suit in the absence of a valid statute
authorizing him to sue." 48 The same, assertion appeared again in a
subsequent case. 49 Later, in City of Goose Creek v. Hunnicutt,50 the court
recognized this conflict and held that in light of the constitutional restrictions,
51
statutes could not confer the right to sue on one with no special interest.
Subsequent decisions, however, persisted in reciting the contention first made
in Dickson.52 In Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Wyatt,53 after an extensive
review of authorities, the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals held that neither
the statute nor the city charter provisions allowed the plaintiffs, as mere
54
taxpayers, to sue on a void contract absent a special interest in the Suit.
In Scott v. Board of Adjustment,"5 the majority of the supreme court
allowed an individual to challenge governmental actions without showing
special injury. 5 Observing that other states allow such actions, the court
said: "Within constitutional bounds, the Legislature may grant a right to a
citizen or to a taxpayer to bring an action against a public body or a right of
review on behalf of the public without proof of particular or pecuniary
damage peculiar to the person bringing the suit."'57 Justice Griffin dissented
in Scott, and indicated his agreement with the opinion of the Waco Court of
Civil Appeals, 58 which had held that -the plaintiffs could not maintain the
59
suit because -theyhad suffered no injury.
It now appears, therefore, that the Texas courts have aligned themselves
with jurisdictions that allow suits by individuals for the benefit of the public,
to the limited extent of permitting such actions when provided for by statute. 0
Two cases subsequent to Scott, McCoy v. Williansland Turullols v. San Felipe Country Club,62 relied heavily on Scott to allow individuals' suits for the
48. Id. at 196, 265 S.W. at 1019.

22.

49. Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 205, 218, 281 S.W. 837, 841-42 (1926).
50. 118 Tex. 326, 15 S.W.2d 227 (1929).
51. Id. at 330, 15 S.W.2d at 228, citing TEx. CONST. art. V, § 21, and art. IV, §

52. E.g., Sullivan v. Universal Elec. Constr. Co., 227 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hoff v. Westhoff, 102 S.W,2d 293, 294 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1936, writ ref'd); Hazelwood v. City of Cooper, 87 S.W.2d 776, 77778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1935, writ ref'd).

53. 359 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1962, no writ).
54. Id. at 260.
55. 405 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1966).
56. Id. at 56.
57. ld. at 56.
58. Id. at 57 (dissenting opinion).
59. Scott v. Board of Adjustment, 393 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1965), rev'd, 405 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1966).
60. Scott v. Board of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. 1966); McCoy v. Williams, 500 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Turullols
v. San Felipe Country Club, 458 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 500 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

62. 458 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (two
judges participating).
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benefit of the public.63 The precise question of the constitutionality of such
actions Without a special interest, under the Texas Constitution, 64 was not
reached in these cases; 65 further, a special interest has usually been required
for the plaintiff to sue in post-Scott cases. 6 Since Scott, only one case,
Marshall v. City of Lubbock, 67 has involved a bond issue, and it was
held there that the plaintiff failed to state a justiciable interest sufficient to
maintain the suit for declaratory relief.a68 In another case, summary
judgment for the defendant was affirmed on a plaintiff's suit to cancel a
lease granted by the city because the plaintiff failed to show a peculiar
injury. 9 Although Turullols and McCoy involved the cancellation of deeds
granted by cities, there seem to be no inroads in the area of public contracts
70
and bond issues in the wake of Scott.
OTHER OBSTACLES CONFRONTING INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS
Even for the plaintiff who has firmly established a special interest, the
doors of the courthouse are not always open. It is, of course, fundamental
to the maintenance of any suit that the plaintiff's pleadings be sufficient. As
such, the plaintiff's special interest must be specifically alleged. If it is not
so alleged, the cause of action is subject to dismissal when the plaintiff fails

to amend after the defendant has specially excepted to this defect. 71 In one

instance, despite the fact that the cause otherwise would have been a proper
one for individual relief, dismissal on special exceptions was held to be
harmless error since the legal and illegal items of an alleged deficiency debt
63. It should be noted that Scott dealt with Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 322, § 1, at 687,
which involved appeals from zoning board of adjustment decisions, while McCoy and
Turullols involved TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1015c (1963), a statute relating to
public recreational facilities.
64. TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1.
65. See Scott v. Board of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. 1966); McCoy v.
Williams, 500 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Turullols v. San Felipe Country Club, 458 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. See Hoffman v. Elliott, 476 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. 1972) (per curiam); City of
West Lake Hills v. State ex rel. City of Austin, 466 S.W.2d 722, 727 (Tex. 1971); Tri
County Citizens Rights Organization v. Johnson, 498 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lozano v. Patrician Movement, 483 S.W.2d 369, 371-72
(Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lower Valley Residents Ass'n v.
City of El Paso, 466 S.W.2d 436, 437-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1971, no writ);
Pierce v. Southern Pac. Co., 410 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ
ref'd).
67. 520 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
68. Id. at 554-55.
69. Marshall v. City of Lubbock, 446 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amaillo
1969, no writ).
70. See cases cited note 66 supra.
71. Rawson v. Brownsboro Independent School Dist., 263 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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could not be determined from the plaintiff's pleadings.7 2 In Armstrong v.
Gaddis,73 plaintiff's failure to plead that he was an heir was fatal to his

mandamus action because he presented no assertion that he succeeded in
title to a judgment for his deceased mother.7 4 A suit to enjoin collection of
an excessive tax was also unsuccessful where the plaintiff failed to allege the
75
amount of the excess or any fact that would allow calculation of it.

Yet another obstacle is found in the fact thatjust as equity will not enjoin
performance on a valid public contract on suit by a taxpayer, 76 neither will
it enjoin performance of a merely voidable one. 77 In such circumstances,
the public officials have discretion, and they alone determine the course to
be taken.7 8 In Osborne v. Keith,79 the court held that in order for a citizen
to bring such a suit, he must bring himself strictly within the established rule
that suits may be brought only in cases of proposed illegal expenditures, and
not upon cases of unwise or indiscreet spending.8 0 As a result, where the
officials have not acted beyond their lawful powers, absent bad faith in
arriving at their decision, the wisdom, necessity, or expediency of their acts
may not be questioned in the courts. 81 Since these functions are legislative,
8 2
the officials are answerable only to the people who elected them.
72. Id. at 581.
73. 214 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948, no writ).
74. Id. at 149-50.
75. Altgelt v. City of San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436, 450, 17 S.W. 75, 77 (1890).
76. Mayer v. Kostes, 71 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1934, writ
ref'd).
77. Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 265, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (1944); Rodgers v.
County of Taylor, 368 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Glimpse v. Bexar County, 160 S.W.2d 996, 999 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1942, writ ref'd).
78. Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 265-66, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200-01 (1944);
Rodgers v. County of Taylor, 368 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Glimpse v. Bexar County, 160 S.W.2d 996, 998-99 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd).
79. 142 Tex. 262, 177 S.W.2d 198 (1944).
80. Id. at 265, 177 S.W.2d at 200. The court in Osborne stated:
The vigilance of a citizen who takes upon himself that burden [suing on a public
wrong] in the interest of good government is to be commended. However, the procedure is generally recognized as being drastic and, in order to be authorized to
maintain such an action, a citizen must bring himself strictly within the established
rules. Governments cannot operate if every citizen who concludes that a public
official has abused his discretion is granted the right to come into court and bring
such official's public acts under judicial review. The right, therefore, of a citizen
to maintain such an action is strictly limited to cases of illegality of the proposed
expenditure and does not extend to cases of unwise or indiscreet expenditures. The
contract upon which it is proposed to pay out public funds must be illegal and not
merely voidable at the option of the public official entrusted with authority in the
premises.
Id. at 265, 177'S.W.2d at 200.
81. Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 267, 177 S.W.2d 198, 201 (1944); Gillam v.
City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
82. Gillam v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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To state a justiciable interest, then, a plaintiff generally must not only
have a special interest in the subject matter of the suit, but the suit must also
involve an act that is done without color of authority.8 3 This rule is
primarily designed to facilitate the smooth operation of government, but it
also serves an important function in the scheme of divided governmental
power. 8 4 The delineations between the three governmental branches, although seldom clear, would be hopelessly penumbral if any citizen could
invoke judicial power to question any act. 85 Yet sufficient judicial scrutiny
is allowed to maintain the balance of powers by allowing suits for abuse of
discretion.86 Such actions, limited solely to the question of abuse of discretion, proscribe legislative and administrative action to their constitutional
8 7
perimeter, with minimal judicial inhibition and interference.
PUBLIC BONDS

Generally, a suit on a void bond issue may not be maintained where there
is no power or authority for the issuance of the bonds because equity will not
do a useless act.88 No liability could be imposed upon the governmental
body, or any taxpayer, by a bond issue if no semblance of authority for the
act was present.8 9 The cases of Polly v. Hopkins,9 0 and Parks v. West, 91
83. See Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 266, 177 S.W.2d 198, 201 (1944); Bee
County v. Roberts, 437 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ)
(suit not allowed); Lawler v. Castroville Rural High School Dist., 233 S.W.2d 613, 616
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, writ ref'd); Walton v. Brownsville Navigation
Dist., 181 S.W.2d 967, 969-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944, writ ref'd) (suit not
allowed).
84. See Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 265, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (1944); Wolf
v. Young, 277 S.W.2d 744, 746-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). "Executive and legislative matters, political matters and matters of policy, in
the absence of personal or vested property rights, special provision by the Legislature,
or some violation of the constitution, are free from judicial control." Id. at 746-47.
85. See Wolf v. Young, 277 S.W.2d 744, 746-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 265, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200
(1944).
86. See Kimbrough v. Walling, 371 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1963); Osborne v. Keith,
142 Tex. 262, 267, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (1944).
87. See Kimbrough v. Walling, 371 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1963); Osborne v. Keith,
142 Tex. 262, 267, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (1944); Wolf v. Young, 277 S.W.2d 744, 74647 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
88. Polly v. Hopkins, 74 Tex. 145, 147, 11 S.W. 1084, 1085 (1889); Johnson v.
Town of Refugio, 56 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1932, no writ)
(dictum); Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co. v. City of Highlands, 44 S.W.2d 1059, 1061 (Tex.
Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1931, no writ) (dictum).
89. Polly v. Hopkins, 74 Tex. 145, 146-47, 11 S.W. 1084, 1085 (1889); Johnson
v. Town of Refugio, 56 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1932, no writ);
Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co. v. City of Highlands, 44 S.W.2d 1059, 1061 (Tex. Civ. App.
-El Paso 1931, no writ).
90. 74 Tex. 145, 11 S.W. 1084 (1889).
91. 102 Tex. 11, 111 S.W. 726 (1908).
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have been said to represent conflicting lines of authority on this point,9 2 but
they may well be distinguishable. In Polly, the bonds were issued by the
county judge to pay for construction of a jail that not only was unauthorized,
but was expressly forbidden by the commissioners court.9 3 In Parks, the
contention was that the bonds were void because the issuing school district
was formed without regard to county lines.9 4 The legislature, although it
acted without authority, sanctioned formation in this manner, so that some
semblance of authority existed. 95 This indicates that a plaintiff may sue in
cases where the issuance, under some circumstances, could be binding on the
body politic concerned. 96 It should be noted, however, that where the lack
of authority for the bond issue is revealed by a source that any prospective
bond purchaser is charged with knowledge of, a taxpayer may not enjoin the
issuance since he could not be injured thereby. 97 This rule is particularly
applicable to the frequently recurring situation where the contract itself
provides that payment can never be demanded from tax funds.98
ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY

A suit to restrain illegal spending of tax funds may be maintained by a
taxpayer since he has a private interest in the subject matter and is suing for
himself.9 9 After the expenditures are complete, however, a suit to enjoin
such use of the funds is moot' 0 0 because the issue in controversy no longer
presents a basis for relief. 1 1 In a suit to enjoin illegal spending, the
92. Note, 17 TEXAs L. REv. 377 (1939).
93. Polly v. Hopkins, 74 Tex. 145, 147, 11 S.W. 1084, 1085 (1889).
94. Parks v. West, 102 Tex. 11, 15, 111 S.W. 726, 729 (1908).
95. Id. at 15, 111 S.W. at 729.
96. Polly v. Hopkins, 74 Tex. 145, 147, 11 S.W. 1084, 1085 (1889); see Johnson
v. Town of Refugio, 56 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1932, no writ);
Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co. v. City of Highlands, 44 S.W.2d 1059, 1061 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1931, no writ).
97. Polly v. Hopkins, 74 Tex. 145, 147, 11 S.W. 1084, 1085 (1889); see Powell v.
City of Baird, 132 S.W.2d 464, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939, no writ); Fisher
v. City of Bartlett, 76 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1934, writ dism'd);
Johnson v. Town of Refugio, 56 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1932,
no writ); Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co. v. City of Highlands, 44 S.W.2d 1059, 1061 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1931, no writ); Womack v. City of West Univ. Place, 32 S.W.2d
930, 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1930, no writ).
98. See, e.g., Franks v. Welch, 389 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Estes v. City of Granbury, 314 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd); Fisher v. City of Bartlett, 76 S.W.2d 535, 536-37 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1934, writ dism'd).
99. Sullivan v. Universal Elec. Constr. Co., 227 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Fausett v. King, 470 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, no writ);
Parr v. First State Bank, 307 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1957, no
writ); Rawson v. Brownsboro Independent School Dist., 263 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 430,
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contract having been fully performed, no relief may be granted and jurisdiction is lost. 10 2 The case, then, may become moot at any time full payment
is made, and the trial or appellate court is left with no recourse but to dismiss
03
the action for an injunction.1
In a suit for recovery of illegally spent public funds, jurisdiction may never
attach because an individual taxpayer is usually unable to state a litigable
interest in such a suit.' 0 4 Such recovery belongs to the governmental
body. 10 5 The public officials have discretion in determining whether or not
to sue; they alone are in a position to weigh the benefits and detriments of
the contract and a suit thereon. 10 6 Other jurisdictions allow such suits by
432 (1973); see Glass v. City of Austin, 533 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1976, no writ); Fausett v. King, 470 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971,
no writ).
102. See Glass v. City of Austin, 533 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1976, no writ); Fausett v. King, 470 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tex.' Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1971,
no writ); Parr v. First State Bank, 307 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1957, no writ) (courts do not decide cases in which nothing remains to be litigated);
Rawson v. Brownsboro -Independent School Dist., 263 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
103. See State v. Society for Friendless Children, 130 Tex. 533, 534, 111 S.W.2d
1075, 1076 (1938) (trial courts will not litigate moot controversies and appellate courts
will not review cases where controversy has terminated); Glass v. City of Austin, 533
S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ); Fausett v. King, 470 S.W.2d
770, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, no writ). The court in Fausett stated: "We
cannot directly pass upon these matters that are of general interest to the public as apparently our Supreme Court has not relaxed its rule of mootness as has been done in
a majority of jurisdictions." Id. at 775. Rawson v. Brownsboro Independent School
Dist., 263 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The de104. Scott v. Graham, 156 Tex. 97, 104, 292 S.W.2d 324, 328-29 (1956).
fendant presented the unique contention, upon plaintiff's suit as a taxpayer to enjoin payment to defendant for services rendered as 'temporary district attorney, that no injunction
should issue because plaintiff could sue to recover the funds in a suit at law on the merits. This contention was rejected because the plaintiff could not bring such an action,
but the injunction sought was denied because plaintiff had no justiciable interest in the
suit. Id. at 104, 292 S.W.2d at 328-29; see Hoffman v. Davis, 128 Tex. 503, 507, 100
S.W.2d 94, 95 (1937); Glass v. City of Austin, 533 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin
1976, no writ); Murray v. Harris, 208 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1948, no writ); Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority v. Tuttle, 171 S.W.2d 520, 524
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (concurring opinion); City of
Corpus Christi v. Flato, 83 S.W.2d 433, 438-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935,
writ dism'd).
105. Scott v. Graham, 156 Tex, 97, 104, 292 S.W.2d 324, 329 (1956); Hulett v. West
Lamar Rural High School Dist., 149 Tex. 289, 291, 232 S.W.2d 669, 670 (1950); Glass
v. City of Austin, 533 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ); Parr
v. First State Bank, 307 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1957, no writ);
City of Corpus Christi v. Flato, 83 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-San -Antonio
1935, writ dism'd) (city's action barred by laches).
106. Hoffman v. Davis, 128 Tex. 503, 508, 100 S.W.2d 94, 96 (1937). The court
in Hoffman stated:
[I]t may be said to be the settled rule in this State that, although a contract made
by a county may be illegal, still the county must account for the benefits which it
derives thereunder. The officer authorized to prosecute this suit might arrive at
the conclusion, after an investigation of all the facts, that, allowing for the benefits
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individuals x0 7 on the theory that the right of recovery cannot be distinguished from the right to enjoin the act, but the contrary rule still applies in
Texas courts.' 0 s Since the public alone may benefit directly from this type
of recovery, the right to initiate these actions is vested exclusively in the
legally constituted public guardians. 100

THE LEGAL GUARDIAN OF PUBLIC RIGHTS

Although members of the general public often cannot obtain redress for
public wrongs, such wrongs do not go without remedy. Actions on public
contracts and bonds, as with all public rights, are properly brought "by such

officer or officers as have been entrusted by the law making power with this

duty." 110 This rule exists because the legislature, by whom such duty is
delegated, is vested by the constitution with full and paramount authority
over the public domain."'
Courts cannot act upon a suit by one who is unable to profit thereby

because they may act only to redress grievances and to prevent wrongs, not
to decide abstract questions.'
As a result, jurisdiction is present only in
113
actions by plaintiffs who have an interest in the subject matter of the suit.

Only persons with a primary legal right may seek judicial redress for an
injury," 4 and the district attorneys, or county attorneys alone, are usually
vested with such right. 115
Other jurisdictions seem to allow suits by individuals for the public when
the officials fail to sue and rely upon the exercise of sound judicial discretion
received, a substantial recovery for the county would not result from the litigation.
If not, manifestly the suit should not be prosecuted, and citizens, as such, should
not be permitted to determine that it should be.
Id. at 508, 100 S.W.2d at 96.
107. Id. at 506, 100 S.W.2d at 96.
108. Hulett v. West Lamar Rural High School Dist., 149 Tex. 289, 291, 232 S.W.2d
669, 670 (1950); Hoffman v. Davis, 128 Tex. 503, 506, 100 S.W.2d 94, 96 (1937);
Murray v. Harris, 208 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1948, no writ).
109. Hulett v. West Lamar Rural High School Dist., 149 Tex. 289, 291, 232 S.W.2d
669, 670 (1950); Hoffman v. Davis, 128 Tex. 503, 508, 100 S.W.2d 94, 96 (1937);
Murray v. Harris, 208 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1948, no writ); City of
Corpus Christi v. Flato, 83 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1935, writ
dism'd).
110. E.g., City of San Antonio v. Strumberg, 70 Tex. 366, 369, 7 S.W. 754, 755
(1888); Hill v. Ramsey, 307 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Hill v. Carr, 307 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, no writ).
111. City of San Antonio v. Strumberg, 70 Tex. 366, 369, 7 S.W. 754, 755 (1888);
Hill v. Ramsey, 307 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
112. Moore v. Stark, 118 Tex. 565, 578, 17 S.W.2d 1037, 1041 (1929).
113. Id. at 578, 17 S.W.2d at 1041.
114. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976).
115. See TEx. CONST. art. V, § 21. See generally TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts.
321-28 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1976) (district attorneys); id. arts. 329-31 (1973),
as amended, (Supp. 1976) (county attorneys); id. arts. 332-41 (1973), as amended,
(Supp. 1976).
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to prevent abuses of such actions. 1 " In Texas, however, such suits would
have to be tried in the same manner as all others, i.e., brought by the district
or county attorney alone. 117 Consequently, only those few recent cases
18
which have held that a statute granted standing without a special interest'
have been deemed to be of the type that Texas courts may be safely trusted
with in preventing improper uses of their processes. 119 The courts of this
state, for the most part, have adhered to the constitutionally mandated
division of powers, manifesting the belief that even "[i]f a wrong has been
done, the usurpation of the power to prescribe a remedy would be a still
greater wrong.' 1 20 The role then, of the legally constituted guardian of
public rights is an important one in Texas jurisprudence and must be
carefully scrutinized and policed by the state's electorate.
CONCLUSION

A public bond issue that is void from its inception may not be enjoined in
a taxpayer's suit because he may not suffer a loss thereby. Likewise, it
seems that the special injury requirement remains fully applicable to all
individual actions on public contracts, despite a slight retrenchment from the
rule in those contexts where the courts have found some statutory basis for
the action. Whether these rigid proscriptions on suits to protect public rights
are in the interest of the public, or work injustices on it, is unimportant from
the point of view of the judiciary. The division of governmental power
among the three departments is expressly required by the constitution, and
until recently, this division has been jealously maintained without encroachment by the courts. Considering this background, statutorily created suits by
individuals with no special interest are without authority and might succumb
to a proper challenge on those grounds. While these cases stand unreversed,
the future of all public actions remains unclear. What is clear, though, is
that under the present constitutional mandate, the proper plaintiff for public
actions in Texas, absent a special interest in the individual plaintiff, both
pragmatically and constitutionally, is the legally constituted guardian of
public rights, and not the individual himself.
116. Hoffman v. Davis, 128 Tex. 503, 509, 100 S.W.2d 94, 97 (1937).
117. Id. at 509, 100 S.W.2d at 97.
118.

Scott v. Board of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. 1966); McCoy v. Wil-

120.

Harrel v. Lynch, 65 Tex. 146, 152 (1885).

liams, 500 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Turullols
v. San.Felipe Country Club, 458 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. See, e.g., Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 265, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (1944);
City of San Antonio v. Strumberg, 70 Tex. 366, 369, 7 S.W. 754, 755 (1888); Franks
v. Welch, 389 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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